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THE RELATION
BETWEEN NATURAL LAW
AND HUMAN LAW IN
THOMAS AQUINAS
RAYMOND BRADLEY*
The question as to exactly how the natural law is related to human or
positive law in the thought of Thomas Aquinas may be answered with the
well-known but deceptively simple response: "Consequently every human
law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of
nature. But if at any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer
a law but a perversion of law."' For Aquinas all human laws are derived
from the natural law, which in turn is a participation in the eternal law of
God. What the relation of human laws to the eternal and natural law is
and precisely how human laws are derived from the natural law in the legal
philosophy of St. Thomas will be examined in some detail.
Thomas defines human laws as "particular determinations [of natu-
ral law] devised by human reason." ' We note first that human laws are
further specifications of the natural law and that these are made by man.
It is significant that Thomas says that these determinations are made by
man's reason; this accords with his general theory of law that it is an
"ordinance of reason . . . . " He is certainly an intellectualist, as opposed
to being a voluntarist, in his legal thinking.
Thomas begins his discussion of how human laws are formulated early
in the treatise on law in Question 91, Article 3. He here compares the
derivation of human laws from the natural law to its analogue in specula-
tive reason. Just as from naturally known self-evident principles of the
speculative reason, e.g., mathematics, we draw specific conclusions that
were not self-evident ornaturally known, so too from the general precepts
of the natural law human reason argues to more particular determinations
(dispositiones) of certain matters. These particular determinations were
discovered or made more explicit by human reason. Although they were
* B.A., Loyola University, 1950; Ph. L., Bellarmine College, 1953; Ph. D., Duquesne Univer-
sity, 1973.
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implicitly contained in the eternal law, they are now rendered explicit or
posited by the use of human reason. They are given a formulation by man
as he discovers them by rational processes. Thomas elsewhere uses the
same analogy, viz, arguing from the use man makes of speculative reason
to that use he may make of practical reason, in proving that there are
several precepts of the natural law.4
In his Second Article of Question 95 on Human Law St. Thomas
explains in more detail how the specific determinations are made from the
natural law or how human laws are formulated. The first way something
may be derived from the natural law is as a conclusion from premises; the
second way is by way of determination (determinatio) of certain generali-
ties. Each of these methods or modes of derivation must be explained in
some detail. An examination of the mode of derivation will shed light on
the important problem of the ontological status of human laws as Thomas
sees them. The obliging force of these laws will be much clearer after this
investigation, for the binding force of a law is a function of its ontological
character.
THE FIRST METHOD OF DERIVATION
The first way a derivation can be made from the natural law is as a
conclusion. It may be called a declarative positive law. Thomas explains
that this is the way that conclusions are drawn in the sciences; it is the
method of deductive logic. The particular example he gives is that of an
abbreviated syllogism: "One should do harm to no man." Hence "one must
not kill."5 This method of deriving conclusions is used both in moral sci-
ence and in the deriving of human laws from the natural law. It is both a
natural law and a human law that men should not murder. A similar
example is given by Aquinas in his Commentary on the Nicomachean
Ethics where he states that from the precept that no harm is to be done to
anyone unjustly, it follows that one should not steal Thus, in this type of
derivation of human law from natural law, the conclusion is now stated as
a human law and, as he notes is done in the sciences, is a direct logical
conclusion of a more general premise. Murder is a more specific type of
injury to another. Since the more general is prohibited by the law of na-
ture, the conclusion, whether it is stated as a specific law of nature or as
human positive law, is a direct consequence of the premises and is so
prohibited.
It is now evident that the conclusions directly deduced from such
general principles of the natural law may be viewed under the formality
of the natural moral law or under that of human law, but materially they
See id., Quest. 95, art. 2.
Id.
In V. Ethic, lect. 12.
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are the same-murder is wrong. Such declarative laws either state in so
many words what the natural law prescribes or forbids, or else draw conclu-
sions directly from the natural law. Further examples of such laws would
be those prohibiting treason, perjury, polygamy, and the like.
Thomas holds that conclusions stated as human laws which are drawn
from the natural law in this manner have some force from the natural law
and do not emanate from human law exclusively.7 This is a further devel-
opment or explanation of his general theory that "the force of a law de-
pends on the extent of its justice."I But anything is just insofar as it is right
according to the rule of reason, and the first rule of reason is of course the
natural law.
The human laws expressed by civil governments arise from a dual
source: the one is the natural moral law and the other is the state itself.
Inasmuch as they are directly derived by a process of reasoning from the
natural moral law they carry the moral force of this law with them. They
are identical to the proper conclusions of the natural moral law; they are
materially the same, but only formally distinct. They differ from the natu-
ral law not in what they prescribe or forbid but only in their mode of
promulgation.
THE SECOND METHOD OF DERIVATION
The second type of derivation discussed by St. Thomas, that by way
of determination of certain generalities, differs significantly from the first
type. This second method of derivation gives rise to what may be called
determinative positive laws. His example of this type of derivation is taken
from an analogy to arts and crafts. General forms are particularized as to
detail, as a carpenter determines the particular style and form of a house
he is building. The precise type of house is a more specific example of house
in general; it is not, as in the first method of derivation, a conclusion from
premises logically deduced. His example is the general fact that evildoers
should be punished, but the precise method of punishment is a determina-
tion of this general principle. In the Fourth Article of Question 95 Thomas
states that the things derived from the law of nature in this way "belong
to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is best for itself."
The state has the power from the eternal and natural law to make laws
regarding prisoners, but the point here is that the precise type of punish-
ment is left to the civil law to determine. Other examples could well be
regulations regarding currency, taxes, traffic laws, etc. These laws have,
so to speak, only an indirect relation to the natural law since, as in the
example of the punishment of prisoners, they merely specify a law that
could be carried out in several different ways. This type of law determines
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II(I), Quest. 95, art. 2.
Id.
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various ways of acting in conformity to the natural law in matters that are
indifferent, but are not themselves deducible from the natural law. They
are not merely echos of the natural moral law, but are indirect determina-
tions of it. As to the moral force of conclusions drawn in this way, Thomas
holds that they have no other force than that of human law. More on the
binding force of such laws will be presented in the next section.
This distinction of Thomas between the two types of derivations under
discussion recalls a similar distinction in Aristotle. The Philosopher, as
Thomas likes to call him, taught that some acts are just and others unjust
by nature as well as by enactment. His words are worth quoting:
Of political justice part is natural, part legal-natural, that which every-
where has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that;
legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is
not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or that a goat
and not two sheep shall be sacrificed . .. .
Aristotle makes a sharp distinction between particular laws and universal
law. He identifies universal law with natural law-that which is just by
nature. Particular law is the law of each community. The one is natural;
the other conventional. Thomas agrees with the Stagarite, but goes beyond
him with his Christian viewpoint. For Thomas, it must be remembered,
all human laws are either directly or indirectly drawn from the natural law,
are ultimately related to the eternal law, and from this law have the power
of binding in conscience.' 0 For Aristotle, there is no clear higher source of
the particular law which the state enacts than the state itself. Aristotle's
man is not the creature of God that he is for St. Thomas.
In summary, there are two ways for Thomas that human laws are
derived from the natural law. First are conclusions from premises made by
deductive logic, analogous to conclusions in the sciences which are derived
directly from the natural moral law. They have their obliging force both
from the natural law and the civil law. Second are determinations of cer-
tain generalities which are the particular laws of individual states or com-
munities and are indirectly derived from the natural law. Their binding
force is from the civil authority alone.
THE BINDING FORCE OF HUMAN LAW
With an insight into the two types of derivation of human law that
Aquinas proposes in mind, we are now in a better position to grasp his
thought on the binding force of human law. St. Thomas was imbued with
a profound spirit of the orderly progression of authority and the need for
I ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics V, in 7 THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1014 (R. McKeon
ed. 1941).
'" SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II(I), Quest. 96, art. 4.
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obedience to authority on man's part." It is a virtue "more praiseworthy
than the other moral virtues."'" That God governs all things by His provi-
dence is demonstrated in several ways in the Summa Contra Gentiles,
Book III, chapter 64. God, the supreme creator and governor and orderer
of the entire universe, rules His entire creation with the eternal law; from
this law proceeds the natural law and from these laws, the human law.
Orderly procession of authority from the highest to the lowest in a strict
hierarchical order is a concept dear to the heart of Thomas Aquinas. He
observes:
Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor,
all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from
the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides
the eternal law. Therefore all laws, insofar as they partake of right reason,
are derived from the eternal law. 3
How man, the subject of various levels of authority and various types
of laws, is bound to the observance of these laws is an important and
practical question to which we now turn our attention. Thomas holds
strongly to the view that men are subject to authority; this is a matter of
justice. In answer to the question as to whether Christians are bound to
obey the secular power, Thomas is unhesitating in his answer that they are.
"Now the order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, else
the stability of human affairs would cease."' 4 Loyalty to God does not
excuse one from loyalty to his state. He likewise teaches that just laws have
also the power of binding in conscience. This power is from the eternal law
from which they are all derived. In support of this Thomas quotes Proverbs
8:15 "By Me Kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things."'5
The binding force of declarative positive laws, those directly proceed-
ing from the natural law, is that they are obviously just and as such must
be obeyed. They share their moral obligation with the natural moral law.
For example, in speaking the truth under oath, one follows the natural
moral law and at the same time observes a human positive law which
directs him to speak truthfully. Laws such as this one against perjury made
by human authority are virtually identical to the natural moral law, just
as the Divine law against blasphemy is a positive statement on divine
authority in agreement with and in support of the eternal law. The prohibi-
tion against perjury arises from both the natural law and the power of the
state to make such enactments.
The close parallel of the h!wman law to the natural law against perjury
His thought on obedience is given in the SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II(I), Quest.
104.
,2 Id., art. 3.
'3 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II(I), Quest. 93, art. 3.
" Id. pt. II(II), Quest. 104, art. 6.
,5 See id., pt. II(I), Quest. 96, art. 4.
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is a clear and obvious example of direct derivation. Few would find fault
with this example. What happens, however, in cases where the natural law
in a given situation is not clear and the corresponding human law is equally
obscure? Perhaps in a more perfect world the natural moral law and the
corresponding human laws would be universally known and accepted by
all men. But such is not the case. For Thomas, only a relatively few pre-
cepts of the natural law are universally known. These are the ones he refers
to as general principles." The proper conclusions of the natural law are not
known by all men, and, we might add, are not accepted by them. These
make up by far the greatest number of natural law prescriptions. This
widespread lack of knowledge and acceptance of conclusions of the natural
law which are far removed from the fundamental principle of "Do good and
avoid evil" is a result of the differing educational, religious, and cultural
influences on man in the various times and places of his historical develop-
ment.
If this flexibility is found in the moral governance of man by the
natural moral law, it is no surprise that a similar, and in fact greatly
expanded situation, holds for human positive law. There simply is not and
cannot be one universal positive law applicable to all men at all times. The
infinite variety of circumstances even within one geographical area at one
time forbids the enactment of laws which have an inflexible and universal
application as well as a direct and immediate derivation from the natural
moral law. Suffice it to say that the further the conclusions are removed
from the fundamental principles of the natural law, the more imperfect
becomes the mutual interpenetration of the human law with the natural
moral law. Thus many human laws appear to lose their relation to the
natural moral law as conclusions from it because both of them are far
removed from the general principles that underlie them. Thomas explains:
"Although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend
to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects.", The
author is writing here explicitly on natural law, but the statement aptly
fits the laws made by man. Thomas comments on the problem by observ-
ing that the "general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all
men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs; and
hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people."'"
He concedes that, as opposed to the laws of speculative reason, human
laws, since they deal with changing and contingent matters and often with
singulars, do not have the certitude that belongs to the speculative sci-
ences. Each has its own realm of operation, and it is sufficient that each
have the certitude proper to its own realm.19
" Id., Quest. 94, art. 4.
I d.
Id., Quest. 95, art. 2, ad. 3.
Id., Quest. 94, art. 3, ad. 3.
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We turn now to the binding force of human laws which are determina-
tions of the natural law. These, we recall, may be called determinative and
are made on matters which are morally indifferent. Thomas gives the
human lawmaker full authority to enact legislation on these indifferent
matters. Such laws are those which concern, for example, the type of
punishment given to prisoners. These laws which are indirectly derived
from the natural moral law have their force from the human law alone.
This distinguishes them from declarative laws, laws directly derived,
which have their force both from the natural law and from the power of
the state such as that authority the state possesses to punish prisoners in
the first place. What is the source of the state's authority to legislate on
morally indifferent matters? Thomas' reply, as we have seen, is that this
power is derived through the natural and eternal law. Without presenting
a full study of Aquinas' thought on the origin and exercise of political
power in the state, a few fundamental notions must be considered. The
study of the development of political power was in an inchoate state in the
Middle Ages. It was not until later writers such as Suarez and Bellarmine
turned their attention to this problem that theories were developed to
explain the source of the political power of the state.
The translation theory is the theory that has become the most widely
accepted. Briefly summarized, it holds that the state is a natural society.
As such, men must of natural necessity live in such a society. All authority
in this state comes from God directly to the people who then transfer or
translate this authority to an individual or to a group while also determin-
ing the type of government under which they choose to live. The govern-
ment is thus established by the consent of the governed.
Although this theory was only vaguely and implicitly formulated in
the thirteenth century, it was at the basis of the political theory of St.
Thomas. ° While all laws ultimately are derived from the eternal law and
have their power from it, "the making of a law belongs either to the whole
people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people." 2' The
state then is a quasi-instrument of God in governing His people. Positive
laws are needed because of the insufficiency of the eternal and natural law
to direct man in the practical affairs of his life. Thomas holds that the
state, in order to provide the benefits of a well-ordered life, has the power
of making laws that oblige the subjects in conscience to obey. The type of
laws under discussion are those referred to as determinative, those the
state formulates on indifferent matters. The subjects are bound to obey
them because of the obliging force we called indirect. Their relation to the
eternal and natural law is through the divinely appointed state authority
which possesses the right to make laws which the citizens must obey.
Thomas does not differentiate between declarative and determinative
2 H. ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT: A TREATisE IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 444 (1945).
21 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. HI(I), Quest. 90, art. 3.
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laws in that section of his thought dealing with the binding force of human
laws. All just laws are equally binding in conscience in their origin whether
they are of the first or second type; their gravity or seriousness will of
course greatly vary. Likewise, as Thomas Gilby, O.P., notes, although for
Aquinas every matter of law is a matter of conscience, the converse does
not hold. Not every matter of conscience could be made a matter of law.
Only those moral precepts which affect public order can be made a matter
of law. Although every crimen might be a peccatum, not every moral lapse
is a crime.22
UNJUST LAWS
Having worked out in some detail the Thomistic theory of the deriva-
tion of human law from the natural law and having viewed briefly his
theory of the binding force of laws, we turn now to a consideration of the
problem of unjust laws. We may introduce the topic of unjust laws with
the insightful observations of the well-known Thomist, Etienne Gilson:
God is a Supreme Lawgiver, but all inferior lawgivers are co-operating with
God in extending to human societies the legal structure of the created uni-
verse. In this view of the world, human laws are derived from the eternal law,
so much so that, because it is not derived from the eternal law, an unjust
law is not a law. In as much as they are not derived from the eternal law, so-
called unjust laws really are not laws at all. Strictly speaking, there are no
such things as unjust laws. To issue such prescriptions and to attempt to
enforce them is to rule, not by law, but by violence. We are not bound in
conscience to obey such orders, or, if we are, the reason is not that such orders
are laws.23
Thomas sees clearly the two strong demands on man and the obligations
imposed upon him. The first demand is to obey laws which are in conform-
ity with the natural moral law and hence with the eternal law, and thus
man is obligated not to obey laws which are against these higher laws. The
second demand on man is to obey as a subject the laws which the legiti-
mate legal authority imposes upon him. The dilemma is that man may not
disobey the higher law, yet he is bound to obey the laws of the civil authori-
ties because their right to make laws and expect obedience to them is
ultimately from God.
St. Thomas' solution to the problem of unjust laws is that while recog-
nizing the civil authority and its right to make laws to govern man, we
must refuse to follow particular laws when they are contrary to the natural
law derived as it is from the eternal law and reinforced by the divine law.
"We must obey God rather than man." (Acts 5:29).
An unjust law retains the appearance of a just law since it is framed
2 T. GnILY, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS 176 (1958).
23 E. GILSON, ELEMENTS OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 266 (1960).
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by one who has power given to him ultimately by the eternal law;24 but
inasmuch as the law is unjust it is no longer a law and must not be obeyed.
There are occasions, however, when the apparent law (which in fact is
unjust and hence no law at all) can be and should be obeyed. This obedi-
ence to unjust laws should be practiced in situations where by so doing one
may avoid scandal or disturbance.25 These laws would be the type that are
against some human good, not against the divine good, as Thomas ex-
presses it, for the latter may never be obeyed. Laws against the human
good are ones made, for example, contrary to the common good, or ones
imposing burdens unequally on the community, or those conducive merely
to the vainglory or cupidity of the lawgiver. An example of laws against
the divine good would be laws made by a tyrant commanding idolatry.
The unjust law of the first type must be obeyed not because of its intrinsic
nature as law (since it lost this in consequence of its being somehow un-
just), but rather because of some other accidental consequence of disobey-
ing it such as giving scandal. No accidental consequence can arise which
would make it permissible to obey laws against the divine good.
These observations on the binding force of human laws and the dis-
tinctions concerning them lead us to two conclusions. First, the lawmaker
must use the greatest wisdom and prudence to formulate laws that are in
fact just and in conformity with the higher laws, the eternal and natural
laws. Not to do so is to invite the breakdown of that order in the state
which is necessary to its very existence. Second, the citizen must use care
and caution and wise deliberation in deciding what laws are unjust. He
must likewise exercise prudence and caution in deciding to obey a law he
determines is unjust lest in his attempt to avoid scandal he may in fact
give it. In 1963 in his famous letter from Birmingham City Jail, Martin
Luther King approved of the position of St. Thomas that an unjust law is
a human law which is not rooted in eternal and natural law. He continues
with another explanation: "An unjust law is a code inflicted upon a minor-
ity which that minority had no part in enacting or creating because they
did not have the unhampered right to vote." 7 Wolfgang Friedman criti-
cizes this formula of King and observes that if it were taken seriously such
laws as those in the Swiss Constitution denying the right to vote to women,
and those laws made in similar situations such as the withholding of cer-
tain rights from public servants or those in the military service, might well
be held void as contrary to the natural law.2"
No readymade formula applicable in all cases is available to enable
either the lawmaker or citizen to decide the justness or injustice of laws.
24 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, Pt. HI(I), Quest. 93, art. 3, ad. 2.
Id., Quest. 95, art. 4.
2Id.
THE NEW LEADER, June 24, 1963.
W. FRIEDMAN, An Analysis of "In Defense of Natural Law," in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 154
(1964).
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Wisdom and experience are two indispensable guides that each must have
in order to judge correctly in these matters.
The end and purpose of the state is to provide the necessary conditions
under which men may live in justice and harmony with others in that
community. The laws of the state must be conducive to its own well-being
and that of the spiritual and material lives of its citizens. Good and just
laws made with this end in mind are necessary for the attainment of the
basic human goals. Human laws, those enacted by the rulers that conform
to the basic human justice by which men must live if they are to fulfill their
role of citizens of the heavenly city as well as the earthly city, are the sine
qua non of the good state. Laws lacking this conformity to justice and
hence to the higher laws that must govern man are essentially destructive
of the good order that must exist in every well-governed state. Rulers and
subjects alike must cooperate in the task of providing human laws consis-
tent with the natural moral law. On this theme Heinrich Rommen com-
ments:
All law must be just: only then can it obtain that power which primarily
holds together and continually renews every community, and in particular
every political community, the power to bind in conscience. But the proper
function of the natural-law doctrine is precisely to show forth the connection
between morality and law. Consequently it must, for the sake of the very
existence of man and his concrete legally ordered communities, ever recur,
and it does in fact always return whenever the genius of law seeks out its own
foundations. 21
PURELY PENAL LAWS
Once Thomas' view on the nature and binding force of law, as well as
his view on unjust laws, are understood, the question of whether or not
purely penal laws exist is readily answered. By purely penal law is meant
a supposed law which does not bind one in conscience to its observance but
only binds the offender to pay the penalty if he is caught. Such laws
therefore would not bind ad culpam but only ad poenam. Violation of
traffic laws when there is no danger of harming anyone or passage of goods
through customs without paying duties are sometimes cited as examples
of such laws.H These are laws which are held by some not to bind in
conscience; the law does not impose an obligation in conscience, but does
carry with it an obligation to pay the penalty if one is apprehended violat-
ing it. Thomas Aquinas evidently did not believe in the existence of these
laws; nowhere in his treatise on law does he mention the possibility of such
a law. 1 He is aware of an analogous case from the rule of the Dominican
21 H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SocIAL HISTORY AND PHILosoPHY 266-
67 (1947).
I A. FAGOTHEY, RIGHT AND REASON: ETHICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 336 (4th ed. 1967).
31 For a good discussion of this topic see M. HERRON, THE BINDING FORCE OF CIVIL LAWS 89-98
(1952).
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Order to which he belonged that bound its members to the observance of
the rule not ad culpam but only ad poenam.32 He did not invoke this
principle when he asked the question whether all laws bind in conscience. 3
Since all laws are derived from the eternal law and have their force from
this law, all laws in the legal theory of Aquinas bind the subjects of the
law to their observance. They are made for the common good, and viola-
tions of these laws are injurious to the general welfare and disruptive of
society. Laws for Aquinas bind in conscience and violations of them are
moral faults proportional to the gravity of the law. A purely penal law does
not appear to fit the legal philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.
THE GOOD NOT SUBJECT TO LAW
In his discussion of both the eternal law and human law St. Thomas
insists that in a very real sense the good are not subject to law, or at least
not in the same manner as those who are evilly disposed. Those W'ho refrain
from evil and are inspired by love poured into their hearts by the Holy
Spirit are not under the law. Here Thomas is speaking of the eternal law.14
Concerning the human law (in the sense of one being subject to it by force),
only the wicked, whose wills are in opposition to it, are under this type of
coercion to obey it. But the virtuous, whose wills are in harmony with the
law, are not subject to it." Virtue, not law, rules their lives. Gilson explains
how in the thought of Thomas the just man is exempt from law. He re-
marks that
it is clear. . . that he who spontaneously follows natural law is more or less
predisposed to acknowledge human law and receive it willingly. When
human law is promulgated, it embarrasses the vicious or rebellious man, but
the just man conforms to it with so perfect a spontaneity that it is as though,
so far as he is concerned, civil law does not exist."
THE NEED FOR HUMAN LAW
A few remarks on the need for human law, included in the study of
the relation between the natural law and human law, will be helpful in
elucidating Thomas' thought. In this connection an analogy or comparison
with the general need man has for direction, aid, and encouragement from
higher sources may help to develop this concept. In discussing the nature
and extent of sacred doctrine, at the very beginning of the Summa
Theologiae Thomas teaches it was necessary for man's very salvation that
a knowledge be revealed by God over and above the purely philosophical
32 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II(I), Quest. 186, art. 9.
Id., Quest. 96, art. 4.
Id., Quest. 93, art. 6, ad. 1. See also id. Quest. 95, art. 5, ad. 2.
Id., Quest. 95, art. 5.
3' E. GILSON, THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAs 267 (1955).
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wisdom which is devised by human reason." This is principally true since
the fact that man is directed to God as an end is not naturally known by
man. Revelation is necessary to man to ensure sufficient knowledge on the
part of all men to enable them to attain their final end. "Therefore, in
order that the salvation of all men might be brought about more fitly and
more surely it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by
divine revelation. 38 A sacred science, besides those truths learned through
reason, or a revealed science, is a necessary part of God's plan for man's
salvation.
In the treatise on law, St. Thomas refers again to the need of what he
now calls divine law. 39 This is a revealed law, a law in some respects
different from the eternal law. Through the natural law, a participation in
the eternal law, the eternal law can to some extent be reasoned to both
regarding its existence and content. Now divine law is of course above
man's natural knowledge. It is revealed law, and as such must be given to
man. In reply to the question as to the need man has for it, St. Thomas
reaffirms that because of his supernatural goal, man must have direction
to it by means that are above his natural powers. The fact that the divine
law cannot err allows it to direct man through the areas of his life wherein
eternal law and natural law give him uncertain directions. These areas are
the concrete changing affairs of life and many of the interior acts of virtue
to which other laws do not extend. Divine law can also sanction and punish
those acts men perform that may not in certain cases be prohibited by the
natural law. The divine law of God is a further development of the eternal
law; it contains explicit statements for the governance of man and direc-
tion to his final end. It may be said to be derived from the eternal law or
sovereign plan of type of divine wisdom directing the entire universe to its
end. Human law too is derived from the natural law which is prior to it.
Just as the divine law flows from the eternal law of God, so too is human
law derived from the natural law.
There are several points of similarity between the need for human law
over and above the natural law and the corresponding need for divine law
in addition to the eternal and natural law. Both the divine positive law of
God and the human laws made by man are positive laws and must be
ordinances of reason, proceeding from the reasonable will of God and man
respectively. We have seen that the divine law acts as a supplement to or
complement of the eternal law inasmuch as it deals with an aspect of
human life and activity to which our human reason cannot perfectly reach,
namely our supernatural destiny. It also gives particular prescriptions that
otherwise could not be known and adds sanctions. Now the law which man
devises for his own government has a similar role in human affairs over and
above the natural law. It first provides directions for man in those areas
" SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II(I), Quest. 1, art. 1.
a Id.
Id., Quest. 91, art. 4.
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of his life that natural law is not able to provide. It gives training in virtue,
an important part of the education of the young that the natural law itself
is not able to give. Further, human law spells out in far more detail just
how this virtue is to be exercised. It delineates what activities are right and
just, especially those that lie on the periphery of the natural law where
there is little certitude as to the details of good human life.
Just as the divine law makes explicit and certain for man what may
be only implicit and vague as far as the eternal law and natural law are
concerned (e.g., how God is to be worshipped and served), so too human
law performs this same valuable function relative to the natural law, giving
more precise and detailed rules governing particular details of his life.
Further, as divine law adds sanction to the eternal law, human law adds
the dimension of reward and punishment to natural law. By force and fear
human laws encourage man to the exercise of virtues to which the natural
law alone may not incline him. The divine law by its explicit statements
on reward and punishments adds a new dimension to the eternal law and
is a powerful incentive to its observance. Divine law is needed, then, to
enable man to share, as Thomas puts it, more perfectly in the eternal law.
By the divine law we are directed to our supernatural end "in a yet higher
way."4 Human law enables man to live in conformity with the natural law
by a similar process. Inasmuch as the positive law perfects the natural law
by supplementing it and making further determinations of it, the observ-
ance of the positive law enables the citizen to fulfill the precepts of the
natural law in a yet higher way.
CONCLUSION
The relation between human law and natural law is of course part of
the larger question of the relation between law and morality. Taking law
in general to mean the legal system or civil code, and natural law to stand
for a system of ethics recognizing the basic rightness or wrongness of
human conduct from a moral point of view, we may draw some conclusions
regarding the relation between these two concepts. Positive law and natu-
ral law, or law and morality, would act in harmony with one another in
society, both directing and counseling man in his human affairs and direct-
ing him to his end. Morality is more ultimate than law as the source and
directing principle of law. Samuel Enoch Stumpf contends:
Legal obligation is not nearly so ultimate as is moral obligation. In spite of
the intimate relation between law and morality, the law is not the standard
of morality. Law and morality are bound together because the function of law
as an agency for controlling human behavior cannot proceed without refer-
ence to moral imperatives. To a large extent, the direction in which the law
will lead human behavior is suggested by the moral tendencies of a com-
munity."
Id., Quest. 1, art. 4, ad. 1.
1 S.E. STUMPF, MORALITY AND THE LAW 239 (1966).
LAW IN THOMAS AQUINAS
Law simply has to mean more than "the prophecies of what the courts will
do in fact."42 This Holmesian formula, an extreme example of a positivistic
and pragmatic outlook, naively overlooks the classical legal tradition of
such great thinkers of the past as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas,
Hobbes, Locke, Suarez, and a host of others.
To define law in terms of what actually takes place in a court of law
is to erect a superstructure without a foundation, to justify practice with-
out a basic norm to ground the practice on and judge it by. Without a
grounding norm there can be no logical basis to determine the difference
between a just law and an unjust one. Nor does it appear that there can
be a just authoritative basis giving the court the power to establish and
enforce law in the first place. Perhaps a great deal of the breakdown of
respect for law and order in our society today can be attributed to the
separation in our recent legal practice of law from any basic moral founda-
tion to establish it, guide it, nourish it, and in general, oversee it. Recent
political activity has underscored the need for a moral foundation to the
legal system. A return to a closer harmony between the law and morality,
perhaps as suggested by Thomas Aquinas, is a pressing need for our legal
system if it is to survive and fulfill its divinely appointed function in our
governmental system.
" Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 457-68 (1897).
